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ABSTRACT
Software-defined networks provide new facilities for de-
ploying security mechanisms dynamically. In particular, it
is possible to build and adjust security chains to protect
the infrastructures, by combining different security functions,
such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for
preventing data leakage. It is important to ensure that these
security chains, in view of their complexity and dynamics,
are consistent and do not include security violations. We
propose in this paper an automated strategy for supporting the
verification of security chains in software-defined networks.
It relies on an architecture integrating formal verification
methods for checking both the control and data planes of
these chains, before their deployment. We describe algorithms
for translating specifications of security chains into formal
models that can then be verified by Satisfiability Modulo
Theories (SMT) solving or model checking. Our solution is
prototyped as a package, named Synaptic, built as an extension
of the Frenetic family of SDN programming languages. The
performances of our approach are evaluated through extensive
experimentations based on the CVC4, veriT, and nuXmv
checkers.
Keywords: Security Management, Software-Defined Net-
working, Formal Verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing dynamics and size of the Internet pose new
challenges in terms of security management. An illustrative
example can be given with the case of connected devices,
such as smartphones and smart objects, even if our work
is not restricted to this specific context. The multiplication
of these devices is an important factor of Internet growth.
It also contributes to a larger attack surface, such as the
recent attack against the Dyn DNS service, which relied on
a botnet of infected smart objects. Malicious applications
targeting these devices are also increasing massively every
year. Preventive security methods that consist in analyzing the
applications before their publication on markets show their
limitations. For instance last year, Kaspersky Labs estimated
that 2,961,727 malwares were published on the official Google
application market [1], [2]. Security mechanisms must be
dynamically adjusted to these evolutive threats. The resources
of devices in terms of memory, cpu, and battery are also often
limited, which may make the local deployment of protective
mechanisms more challenging.
In the meantime, the programmability offered by software-
defined networks (SDN) provides new perspectives with re-
spect to protection [3], [4]. First, security mechanisms such
as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and data leakage
prevention services, can be virtualized in cloud infrastructures,
and be offered as outsourced services. We will refer to them
as security functions in the remainder of this paper. Second,
these functions can then be combined to build elaborate
security chains that are deployed and adjusted, in a dynamic
manner, to protect devices and their associated applications.
These chains can be fully outsourced in the network, or with
a hybrid in-cloud/on-device deployment scheme. Software-
defined networking separates the control plane from the data
plane and interconnects them by an open interface, which may
typically be the OpenFlow protocol. In our case, the data plane
corresponds to the forwarding switches with the security func-
tions that are currently deployed in the network, whereas the
control plane describes the orchestration underlying automatic
modifications of the configuration of the data plane. In this
way, different security functions can be combined as a chain
and deployed in the network. This dynamic chaining allows
for an adaptive response to attacks. However, it is crucial to
ensure that these security chains, in view of their complexity
and dynamics, are consistent. Misconfigurations may reduce
their efficiency, and introduce security violations.
We therefore study in this paper the use of automated
techniques for verifying security chains in software-defined
networks. Our approach relies on a software-defined architec-
ture and integrates formal verification methods for checking
both the control and data planes. We introduce algorithms
for translating specifications of security chains into formal
models that are then automatically verified by SMT solving
and model checking. Our solution has been prototyped as
a package, named Synaptic, built as an extension of the
Frenetic family of SDN programming languages. The solution
is evaluated through extensive experiments using the checkers
CVC4 [5], veriT [6] and nuXmv [7]. Our main contributions
are: (i) the design of an automated verification strategy and
its architecture, (ii) algorithms for translating specifications of
security chains into formal models, (iii) the prototyping of
the Synaptic package as an extension of the Frenetic language
family, and (iv) the performance evaluation with different tools
for SMT solving and model checking.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II gives an overview of existing work in the area.
Section III describes our automated verification strategy, its
architecture and the supporting algorithms for generating for-
mal models based on security chains. It then presents our pro-
totype, named Synaptic, built as an extension package for the
Frenetic language family. Section IV describes performance
results obtained with different verification tools. Section V
concludes and points out future research perspectives.
II. RELATED WORK
The increasing development of cloud infrastructures has
spurred the virtualization and outsourcing of a large variety
of network services, including for security purposes. Network
programmability provides a support for combining them in
order to elaborate service chains. For instance, Sherry et
al. [8] propose a solution for dynamically and transparently
outsourcing middleboxes across several cloud providers using
virtualization and different redirection mechanisms. Gibb et
al. [9] present a similar approach where a cloud-based architec-
ture is designed for outsourcing network functionalities using
SDN. Regarding the chaining of such network functionalities,
Qazi et al. introduces SIMPLE [10], a policy enforcement
layer based on SDN and flow correlation for middlebox
traffic steering. In the same vein, Fayazbakhsh et al. propose
Flowtags [11], an architecture where middleboxes are extended
to support OpenFlow and to deal with dynamic middlebox flow
mangling. In the area of smart devices, Sapiol et al. [12] define
a Network Function Virtualization (NFV) router to provide a
per-user policy enforcement on mobile applications through
service chaining. Previous work of our group [13], [14] pro-
posed the design of security chains for protecting such devices,
and showed their benefits. The dynamics and multiplication
of elaborated chains require verification techniques to ensure
their consistency.
There exists a substantial body of literature for support-
ing the verification of data planes in the area of software-
defined networking. The purpose is typically to prevent mis-
configurations that could lead to black holes and loops in
the network. For instance, VeriCon [15] is a language for
specifying software-defined networking policies and is accom-
panied by a solution for checking whether a policy verifies
invariants expressed using predicate logic. It does not address
the specification of temporal aspects of the control logic.
NICE [16] is another example of SDN verification based on
unit tests; however, tests cannot ensure complete coverage
of the behavior of complex systems such as SDN policies.
FlowChecker [17] represents the data plane as a binary de-
cision diagram (BDD), whereas properties are expressed in
computation tree logic (CTL). The complexity of the BDD-
based modeling may constitute an obstacle to its large-scale
deployment. VeriFlow [18] also proposes support for the real-
time verification of OpenFlow rules, but its low level of
abstraction may make it cumbersome to verify large security
chains. Finally, VeriSDN [19] is another example of control
plane verification in the specific case of SDN-based firewalls,
although the verification of more sophisticated security func-
tions is considered. In a similar spirit, work by Shaer et al. [20]
considers anomaly detection in distributed firewalls. Most of
these approaches are focusing on the verification of the data
plane, and may miss dynamic aspects of the chain operating
on the control and data planes.
Decoupling the functional specification of security chains
and their translation into low-level configuration rules is an
important requirement for enabling their formal verification,
which motivates the use of high-level network programming
languages. The Frenetic language family for network pro-
gramming [21] counts among the most prominent approaches
for verifying the control plane. It includes a language, called
Pyretic, for specifying network configurations in Python; these
configurations are then compiled into low-level rules [22].
Pyretic is complemented by an extension, called Kinetic, for
describing control plane policies; Kinetic also offers formal
verification techniques [23]. Whereas this work is restricted
to the verification of the control plane, we argue in favor of
verifying both the security functions chaining of the data plane
and the dynamics of the control plane in an integrated manner
in order to prevent errors due to potential misconfigurations.
III. AUTOMATED VERIFICATION OF SECURITY CHAINS
We propose in this paper an automated strategy for verifying
both the control and data planes of security chains in software-
defined networks before their deployment or re-configuration.
Our goal is to analyze both the consistency of the data plane,
taking into account its dynamic evolutions specified by the
control plane. The solution is based on a dedicated archi-
tecture, which includes a verifier, named Synaptic, capable
of translating security chain specifications into formal models
that can be verified by SMT solving or model checking.
A. Proposed architecture
The architecture is depicted in Figure 1, with the illustrative
context of protecting smart devices, such as smartphones.
However, our work is not limited to this specific use case, since
security chains are used more widely. The figure highlights
three main entities: (i) on the left, the smart device, with
several running applications, to be protected with an integrated
agent (which can typically be instantiated by an OpenFlow
virtual switch for redirection purposes); (ii) in the middle, a
cloud provider infrastructure hosting several security functions
as well as a security manager, and (iii) on the right, the remote
destinations interacting with the applications executed on the
smart device. The security manager is supported by an SDN
controller that orchestrates security chains, using the Pyretic
network programming language. In addition to the Kinetic
extension that provides functions for verifying the control
plane (blue), it exploits our Synaptic checker for verifying
the data plane (shown in red). Finally security functions can
be deployed either on the device or in a cloud infrastructure
(dashed lines).
When an application initiates a communication with a re-
mote destination, all the messages from and to that application
go through the agent (virtual switch) of the device. The
switch may probe the SDN controller from the cloud provider
in order to know how to redirect the related messages for
Figure 1. Our architecture supporting the orchestration and verification of security chains.
security checks. Depending on the risks and the context, the
security manager activates the appropriate security functions.
By pushing the necessary SDN rules within the cloud provider
network, the controller composes the security functions to
build an appropriate chain and notifies the switch. The latter
directs the incoming and outgoing traffic through the chain
before forwarding it to the final destination. Security functions
can either be hosted locally on the smart device or in the
cloud. Compositions of security functions are designed by
the security manager according to several factors, including
the originating application, the remote destination, and the
network properties. For instance, the security functions may
include network or applicative firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, and mechanisms for preventing data leakage. They
are not limited to traffic analysis, but may also include
functions analyzing the configuration of smart devices and
their applications. The design of these chains and the choice
of security functions is out of the scope of this paper: we focus
on their automated verification.
B. Extension of the Frenetic framework
Figure 2. Interaction diagram among the components of our architecture.
Our solution extends the Frenetic framework. Specifically,
the Pyretic network programming language is used for describ-
ing data plane configurations. The language includes four basic
rules to express a static filtering on the traffic, namely: identity
to forward all packets without conditions, drop to block
all packets without condition, match(x=y) to forward only
packets for which field x has the value y, and modify(x=y)
to forward all packets and set the field x to the value y. They
can be composed using three different composition operators: a
sequential operator (), a parallel operator (+) and a negation
operator (∼). In addition, the Kinetic language, also part of the
Frenetic family, is intended for specifying and verifying the
control plane, as a finite state machine. More specifically, it
makes use of the NuSMV model checker to verify whether
the corresponding automaton satisfies properties written as
formulas of the temporal logic CTL. However, it does not
verify the data plane.
We therefore define an extension of the Pyretic language
capable of verifying the data plane. Our checker, that we
call Synaptic, is based on a translation of the rules of this
language into formal models. We consider two categories
of formal models for supporting this verification. The first
category corresponds to SMT solving. It is based on rep-
resenting the conditions verified by the security chain as a
set of logical constraints containing variables. This model is
received as input by an SMT solver that checks its satisfiability
by searching an assignment of the variables that makes all
the constraints true. The second category is based on model
checking. In that case, the rules are represented as a finite state
machine, and the properties are specified in a (temporal) logic,
similar to the verification of the control plane. Starting from
this representation, a model checker builds the set of reachable
states of the automaton, and checks the validity of properties,
building a counter example when the property is violated.
Figure 2 illustrates the interactions among components in
our architecture. The security chains that are specified in
Pyretic are sent by the security manager to the Synaptic
checker. They may first be checked using the Kinetic extension
to identify inconsistencies in the control plane. The Synaptic
checker then translates the chain specifications into a formal
model, which is interpreted by an SMT solver or a model
checker. The validation results are then sent back to the
security manager, in order to determine whether the security
chain can be deployed in the network. If this is the case,
the security manager interacts with the SDN controller, which
instantiates the chaining with the support of virtual switches.
C. Verification based on SMT solving
We first explain the verification of security chains based on
SMT solving. In that context, the specification of a security
chain is translated into the SMTlib input language of SMT
solvers. Let x be a packet field, x after be the same field after
a modification, y be a value, and p1 and p2 be given policies.
The translation function of Synaptic, in the following denoted
by f , is defined in a quite straightforward way based on the
grammar of Pyretic, in three main steps:
1) Translation of the Pyretic elementary rules into atomic
propositions, as follows:
• f (identity)→ true and f (drop)→ false ,
• f (match(x = y))→ (= x y),
• f (modify(x = y))→ (= x after y).
2) Translation of composition operators (sequence, parallel,
and negation) into Boolean expressions, as follows:
• f (p1  p2) → f (p1) ∧ f (p2),
• f (p1 + p2) → f (p1) ∨ f (p2),1
• f (∼ p1) → ¬f (p1).
3) Translation of properties of the security chain into
SMTlib constraints. For a given security chain c and
a property p, we want to make sure that the implication
c → p is valid. This is equivalent to verifying that
c ∧ ¬p is unsatisfiable: the latter expression appears in
the generated SMTlib input.
In order to illustrate this process, we consider a simple
security chain composed of four security functions, noted
Fi , with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} corresponding to only firewalls.
However, our solution is not limited to a specific security
function. The Pyretic specification corresponding to this chain
appears in Listing 1. Each security function is described by
composing the match rules that are applied to ip addresses
and port values. For instance, the function F3 only accepts
packets whose source port is 4000, 5000 or 6000. These
different functions are then combined using the sequence,
parallel and negation operators to specify the final chain.
1The output of p1 + p2 is composed of the union of p1 and p2, which
explains the translation of this operator as a disjunction.
F1 = match(srcip=IP("198.122.37.15")) +
match(srcip=IP("253.182.3.14"))
F2 = match(srcport=1000) + match(srcport=2000) +
match(srcport=3000)
F3 = match(srcport=4000) + match(srcport=5000) +
match(srcport=6000)
F4 = match(dstport=7000) + match(dstport=8000) +
match(dstport=9000)
chain = ((F1  F2)+(˜F1  F3))  F4
Listing 1. Pyretic specification of a toy security chain.
The chain behavior can be described literally as follows: if the
security function F1 accepts a given packet, it is transmitted
to the security function F2; otherwise, it is transferred to
the security function F3. All packets that are accepted by
F2 or F3 are finally transmitted to F4. Assume that we
want to check the following property of the chain: each
packet accepted by F1, F2 and F4 or rejected by F1 and
accepted by F3 and F4 must be accepted by the chain.
(set-option:produce-models true)
(set-logic QF_LIA)
; Declaration of variables and values
(declare-const allowed Bool)
(declare-const srcip Int)
(declare-const ip0 Int)
...
; Translation of the security chain
(assert (and
(distinct port3 port5 port0 port7 ip1
port8 port1 port4 port6 port2 ip0)
(= allowed (and
(or (and (or (= srcip ip0) (= srcip ip1))
(or (= srcpt port0) (= srcpt port1)
(= srcpt port2)))
(and (not(or (= srcip ip0) (= srcip ip1)))
(or (= srcpt port3) (= srcpt port4)
(= srcpt port5))))
(or (= dstpt port6) (= dstpt port7)
(= dstpt port8))))
; Translation of the property
(and
(or (and (or (= srcip ip0) (= srcip ip1))
(or (= srcpt port0) (= srcpt port1)
(= srcpt port2))
(or (= dstpt port6) (= dstpt port7)
(= dstpt port8)))
(and (not(or (= srcip ip0) (= srcip ip1)))
(or (= srcpt port3) (= srcpt port4)
(= srcpt port5))
(or (= dstpt port6) (= dstpt port7)
(= dstpt port8))))
(not allowed))))
(check-sat)(get-model)(exit)
Listing 2. SMTlib input generated for the toy example (excerpt).
Listing 2 shows the (slightly abridged) result of translating
the toy security chain and the above property into the SMTlib
language. It includes the declaration of variables and values
(abstracting the concrete ip and port values), the translation
of the security chain, and the translation of the (negated)
property. In particular, each composition operator is translated
into a boolean operator, and the overall constraint represents
the condition for a packet to be accepted by the chain. The
generated file is fed to an SMT solver, which will return a
verdict of unsatisfiability if the property is valid or else a
model that encodes a counter-example to the property.
D. Verification based on model checking
Our Synaptic checker also supports the verification of
security chains based on model checking. This is a direct
complement to the existing functionality of Kinetic for ver-
ifying the control plane. However, the translation of a Pyretic
specification into a finite state machine (or automaton), that
can be verified by model checking, is less intuitive than
the translation into an SMT model. In order to perform this
translation, we extract strictly sequential sub-chains from the
security chain described in Pyretic. The following inductive
definition introduces the conditions for a chain C to be strictly
sequential:
• C ∈ {identity , drop,match,modify},
• C = ∼ C1 where C1 is strictly sequential,
• C = C1  C2 where C1 and C2 are strictly sequential.
Subchains built solely from basic rules, negation, and sequen-
tial composition are grouped together and define the transitions
of the automaton, whereas the parallel composition forms the
basis for defining the states of the automaton. Our translation
algorithm therefore generates the data plane automaton from
the Pyretic specification, based on the following steps:
1) Initially, generate the initial and final states of the data
plane automaton.
2) Generate a variable corresponding to each packet at-
tribute (e.g. srcip, srcport) that appears in the speci-
fication. These variables are used to specify transition
conditions.
3) For each parallel composition, generate an automaton
state. These states describe the position of a packet in
the security chain. In particular, a packet is considered as
accepted when it reaches the final state of the automaton.
4) For each strictly sequential sub-chain, generate an au-
tomaton transition. The conditions on this transition
correspond to a combination of the elementary rules of
the considered sequence.
Figure 3 illustrates the automaton obtained from the Pyretic
specification for the example described in the previous sub-
section. The values for each packet attribute are abstracted by
symbolic values, and the states associated to the security chain
are noted S0, . . .S5.
The resulting automaton is represented in a nuXmv model
as a finite state machine. It is complemented by the speci-
fication of properties to be verified on the chain, written as
temporal logic properties to be verified by the model checker.
Listing 3 illustrates the properties obtained for our example.
S0
S1 S2
S3 S4
S5
srcip ∈ {ip0 , ip1} srcip /∈ {ip0 , ip1}
srcpt ∈ {port0 , . . .} srcpt ∈ {port3 , . . .}
dstpt ∈ {port6 , . . .} dstpt ∈ {port6 , . . .}
Figure 3. Data plane automaton for the toy example.
AG(((srcip=ip0 | srcip=ip1) &
(srcpt=port0 | srcpt=port1 | srcpt=port2) &
(dstpt=port6 | dstpt=port7 | dstpt=port8))
-> EF state=S5)
AG(((!(srcip=ip0 | srcip=ip1)) &
(srcpt=port3 | srcpt=port4 | srcpt=port5) &
(dstpt=port6 | dstpt=port7 | dstpt=port8))
-> EF state=S5)
Listing 3. Generated formal specification interpretable by a model checker.
These properties are expressed in the temporal logic CTL.
The formulas are built up using the path quantifiers A and E
and the temporal operators F and G. They assert that any data
packet whose attributes satisfy the conditions of one of the
subchains may reach the final state and therefore be accepted
by the security chain. The state machine, together with the
temporal formulas, can be passed to nuXmv in order to verify
the same properties as the ones verified by SMT solving in the
previous sections. Alternatively, properties could be expressed
in LTL (linear-time temporal logic), or they could express
safety properties that the automaton should satisfy in every
state.
E. Implementation of Synaptic
We have implemented our Synaptic checker and its trans-
lation algorithms, as a verification package written in Python.
It has been designed as an extension of the Pyretic SDN pro-
gramming language, and exploits the Kinetic extension, part
of the Frenetic language family. Our package can be used to
verify both the control and data planes of security chains built
using the Pyretic language. As depicted in Figure 2, it takes
as input the specification of a given security chain expressed
in Pyretic, and provides back to the security manager the
verification results, corresponding to a verdict on the validity
of the chain. Based on this analysis, the security manager can
then interact with the SDN controller, so that the security chain
is deployed in the programmable network.
Internally, the Synaptic checker relies on two main building
blocks: a semantic analyzer capable of interpreting the security
chain and its symbols, and a model generator capable of
generating a given formal model. The model generator is
defined in an abstract manner, so that our checker can easily
be extended to other formal languages. We have currently
implemented two model generators corresponding to each of
the translation algorithms presented below:
• an SMTlib model generator, which produces a formal
specification interpretable by an SMT solver, including
CVC4 and veriT,
• a nuXmv model generator, which produces a formal
specification interpretable by the nuXmv solver.2
Our checker can first verify the control plane associated to
the security chain, with the support of the Kinetic extension. It
then generates the formal specifications corresponding to the
data plane, and transmits them to the corresponding solver.
The verification of a given security chain can be performed
pro-actively by exploring all the possible states reachable by
the control automaton, and then all the possible data planes,
or can also be performed more reactively by only considering
a subset of possible data planes depending on the changes
operated on the security chain.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluated the performance of our prototype through an
extensive series of experiments. In particular, we wanted to
compare the performances obtained with the two translations
to SMTlib and nuXmv, as well as for different SMT solvers
in order to evaluate the overhead introduced by Synaptic.
The experimental setup was based on a MacBook Air laptop
computer with a Intel Core i5 (1.7 GHz) processor, and 4Gb
of RAM memory. We considered the three following solvers:
CVC4 (version 1.4), veriT (version 201506), and nuXmv
(version 1.0.1). In order to perform these experiments, we
have implemented an additional Python module capable of
generating synthetically the security chains that are used as
inputs of our Synaptic checker. This generation takes into
account several parameters, including:
• the size of the control plane automaton specifying the
changes to the security chain in response to network
events, measured as the number of states;
• the size of the security chain expressed in terms of both
width and length;
• the number of properties that have to be verified by the
checker on the security chain.
While varying these different parameters, we evaluated the
response time and memory consumption observed with SMT
solving and model checking. This evaluation includes the
translation of the specification into a given formal model,
and its checking by a given solver. We used the Python
time module and the valgrind memory profiler to perform our
measurements and obtain statistically grounded results.
2We use nuXmv rather than its predecessor NuSMV used by Kinetic in
order to directly express the constraints on packet attributes.
Figure 4. Response time vs. size of the control automaton.
A. Impact of the control automaton size
In a first series of experiments, we are interested in
quantifying the impact of the size of the control automaton
on the verification performance. Our checker supports both
the verification of the control and data planes. The size of
the automaton directly influences the number of processes
required for verifying the security chain. Consider the case
of a security chain with an automaton composed of n states.
The Synaptic checker therefore must perform n+1 verification
processes: one supported by the Kinetic extension to check the
control plane, and n processes corresponding to the different
automaton states to check the data plane. We use our Python
module to generate security chains with different control
automaton sizes, varying from 0 to 100 states, in order to
quantify the response time and memory consumption induced
by our Synaptic checker.
Figure 4 represents the response time (in seconds) of our
checker with different backend solvers: CVC4, veriT, and
nuXmv. As the verification of the control plane is also based
on model checking, it is possible to execute the verification of
both control and data planes in a single nuXmv instance. This
case corresponds to the last curve, noted nuXmv∗. According
to these results, we can observe that the response time grows
linearly with the size of the control automaton for each of the
verification methods. The best performance with that respect
is obtained with the nuXmv∗ configuration, where the control
and data planes are verified in the same nuXmv instance.
Surprisingly, the worst case is given by the nuXmv curve, with
one verification process per automaton state. In that case, the
response time is nevertheless still quite acceptable, with a total
time of 3.5 seconds for a control automaton of 100 states.
We also quantify the impact on the memory consumption
with these different automaton sizes. Figure 5 indicates the
maximal memory consumption required during the verification
process. Only two curves are visible in this figure, one
corresponding to the nuXmv∗ verification, and another one
Figure 5. Memory consumption vs. size of the control automaton.
corresponding to the performance of CVC4, veriT and nuXmv,
which are identical. For these three last approaches, the highest
memory consumption is always generated by the process sup-
porting the verification of the control plane, using the Kinetic
extension and the nuXmv model checker. In these experiments,
the nuXmv∗ approach consumes more memory, with a supra-
linear behavior when varying the size of the control automaton.
In particular, we obtain a memory consumption of 62 Mb for
a 100-state automaton. The three other curves (CVC4, veriT,
nuXmv) are characterized by a linear behavior, with a memory
consumption of about a third of that of nuXmv∗ for the
same 100-state automaton. Therefore, the low response time
given by nuXmv∗ is balanced by a higher memory footprint,
which can constitute a limiting factor in scenarios where
many security chains have to be checked: for instance, in the
case of several security chains protecting several individual
applications on a set of smart devices.
B. Impact of the width and length of the security chain
In a second series of experiments, we evaluate to what
extent the width and length of the security chain impact the
performance of our Synaptic checker. As we are only focusing
on the data plane in these experiments, we do not distinguish
the nuXmv and nuXmv∗ cases. We therefore only consider the
verification results obtained with the backends CVC4, veriT,
and nuXmv.
We first study the impact of the width of the security chain,
corresponding to the number of functions (or rules) to be
composed in parallel. Figure 6 illustrates the response time
of our prototype, while varying the width of the security
chain from 100 to 1000. The observed response times grow
slightly more than linearly for the three verification methods.
We expected the same phenomenon as for the experiments
done with the control automaton. In fact, the best performances
are obtained with nuXmv. This latter provides a value of 0.8
seconds for a security chain width of 1000, while CVC4 and
veriT generate values of respectively 6.4 and 15.9 seconds for
Figure 6. Response time vs. width of the security chain.
Figure 7. Memory consumption vs. width of the security chain.
the same conditions. When we analyze the results with respect
to memory consumption, which are shown in Figure 7, we can
observe that veriT requires 62.81 Gb of memory for the widest
security chains. CVC4 and nuXmv are much more efficient
and only consume respectively 29.89 Mb and 202.67 Mb in
the worst cases.
We then focus on the length of the security chain cor-
responding to the number of functions (or rules) that are
composed sequentially in the chain. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate
respectively the performance in terms of response time and
memory consumption, considering a security chain with a
length varying from 10 to 100 functions. This parameter has
an important impact on the response time of CVC4, with a
value of more than 100 seconds in the worst case, while the
two other approaches, nuXmv and veriT, maintain acceptable
values in these conditions. The results on memory consump-
tion are only indicated for the backends nuXmv and veriT,
with CVC4 being disqualified by its bad timing behavior. It
Figure 8. Response time vs. length of the security chain.
Figure 9. Memory consumption vs. length of the security chain.
appears that veriT consumes less memory than nuXmv for the
smallest security chains, from a size of 10 to 60. However,
when the length increases from around 80 to 100, nuXmv
shows the best results, with a stable value around 26 Mb,
while veriT requires almost 127 Mb in the worst conditions.
These series of experiments on length and width go in favor of
nuXmv (model checking), rather than CVC4 and veriT (SMT
solving), when addressing complex security chains.
To complement these results, we perform a third series
of experiments, where we quantify simultaneously the im-
pact of the width and length of the security chains for the
nuXmv backend, which provided the best performances so
far. Figure 10 gives the observed response times with a width
varying from 100 to 1000, and a length varying from 10 to 30
(corresponding to the different plotted curves), representing
a total number of rules from 1000 to 30000. The most
complex security chains require more than 450 seconds of
verification time. Some additional optimizations with respect
Figure 10. Response times of nuXmv vs. both width and length.
Figure 11. Performance of nuXmv vs. number of properties to be checked.
to nuXmv formal modelling could be envisioned to reduce
these values, such as reducing the domains associated to packet
field representations, or reducing the number of initial states
based on the requirements induced by the properties that have
to be checked.
C. Impact of the number of properties to be checked
In a last series of experiments, we study more specifically
the impact of the number of properties that have to be satisfied
by the security chain. Again, due to the previous performance
results we only consider the nuXmv backend, where properties
are expressed in the temporal logic CTL.
Figure 11 shows both the response time and memory con-
sumption generated by our Synaptic checker with the nuXmv
backend, considering a security chain composed of 1000
functions, and varying the number of properties to be checked
from 100 to 1000 properties. The performances appear to be
linear with respect to the number of properties. More precisely,
the response time varies from 0.69 to 1.46 seconds, while the
memory consumption goes from 43.34 to 173.99 Mb.
These performance results could be improved depending on
the nature of the properties. For instance, when checking sim-
ple invariants rather than more complex temporal properties,
we could use more efficient dedicated algorithms available in
nuXmv.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed in this paper an automated approach for
verifying security chains that are deployed in software-defined
networks. Our solution takes into account both the control
and data planes of these critical chains, which combine dif-
ferent security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, and services for preventing data leakage. We have
described the architecture supporting our technique, as well as
the behavior and interactions among its different components.
In particular, we have presented our Synaptic checker, which
is capable of generating formal models from the security chain
specifications, through an extension of the Frenetic language
family. We have designed and implemented translation al-
gorithms that underlie verifications of the data plane based
on SMT solving and model checking, complementary to the
verification of the control plane performed using Kinetic. We
developed a prototype of our solution implementing these
algorithms, and evaluated its performances through extensive
series of experiments based on the backend solvers CVC4,
veriT, and nuXmv. The experiments showed the benefits and
limits of these methods in terms of response time and memory
consumption while varying different sizes of security chains,
and numbers of properties to be checked on them.
As future work, we are working on an extension of our
translation algorithms to support more complex and advanced
rules associated to the security functions. We are also inter-
ested in pursuing the optimizations of formal models that we
are generating automatically, based on the nature of checked
properties. Finally, we want to investigate further the integra-
tion of this automated verification process into the context of
an automated management framework for security chains.
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